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I. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
A. ARGUMENT. 
1. The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion in Refusing 
to Continue Trial of the Case is Established by 
the Franchisee's Failure to Even Address, Let 
Alone Rebut, the Franchisor's Claim that the Fran-
chisee Acted in Bad Faith in Withholding Account-
ing Documents Crucial to the Case. 
The record establishes that the Franchisee purposely 
withheld for tactical advantage three categories of crucial 
accounting documents. The Franchisee himself acknowledges the 
vital importance of these documents: "[t]he 4,000 plus accounting 
exhibits are the core of the wrongs in this case. . . . " (Appel-
lee's Brief at 72) . The Miller Report was not produced until 27 
days before trial, and only then after the Franchisee's counsel 
broke several promises to produce the Report €>arlier and after 
the Court formally compelled its production (R. 2623-24, 2685). 
Portions of the Miller Work Papers were produced only 18 days 
before trial (R. 2685). Most of the Franchisee Work Papers— 
although in existence more than three months before trial—were 
not produced until 11 days before trial. (R. 2686-87). And even 
by the morning trial began, the Franchisee had still failed to 
produce some of the Franchisee Work Papers. (R. 2701-03). 
It is this pattern of dilatory, patchwork production of 
"core" accounting documents that prompted the Franchisor to 
-2-
charge in its brief that "[i]n retrospect, there can be no real 
dispute that the Franchisee's counsel repeatedly misrepresented 
the existence, nature and extent of these documents." (Appel-
lant's Brief at 23) . Notably, the Franchisee completely failed 
in his brief to address or even attempt to rebut this charge. 
His failure to do so is an admission that he acted in bad faith 
in delaying production of documents crucial to his case. Under 
Utah law, the absence of good faith by the party resisting a 
requested continuance is a decisive factor governing a court's 
decision to continue trial of the case. Christenson v. Jewkes, 
761 P.2d 1375, 1377, n. 2 (Utah 1988). 
Recognizing the serious jeopardy in which the trial 
court's decision to deny the requested continuance is placed by 
the Franchisee's undisputed bad faith, the Franchisee advances 
eight reasons why his failure to produce the Franchisee Work 
Papers was not prejudicial. (Appellee's Brief at 28, 29). 
Wholly apart from the obvious fact that these "explanations" are 
confined solely to the Franchisee Work Papers and do not even 
address the Franchisee's reasons for not producing the Miller 
Report and the Miller Work Papers, none of these explanations is 
supported by any citation to the record. The Court, therefore, 
cannot consider them. 
-3-
Moreover, contrary to the Franchisee's claim, the 
Franchisor did not " . . . twice waive the motion for a continu-
ance by stipulation." (Appellee's Brief at 27). To support that 
claim, the Franchisee cites two portions of the record, Tr. at 
R. 5237-44 and 5280-81. These citations, however, pertain solely 
to proceedings conducted near the end of trial—four trial days 
after the Franchisor pleaded for a continuance before the jury 
was empaneled. (R. 2677-89, 2701-03; Tr. at R. 4269-86). These 
later proceedings have no connection with, or probative effect 
on, the merits of the Franchisor's forceful, abundantly supported 
and unqualified pre-trial request for continuance. 
Because the trial court denied the Franchisor's 
request, the Franchisor was forced to proceed to trial. It was 
not until the fourth day of trial that the Franchisee offered and 
the Franchisor objected to the trial court's receipt in evidence 
of the Franchisee Work Papers. (Tr. at R. 5229-36) . At that 
point, the court overruled the objection, Tr. at R. 52 37, but 
allowed the Franchisor's counsel to defer for three days (includ-
ing an intervening weekend) his cross-examination of the Franchi-
see's accounting expert. (Tr. at R. 5237-38). Forced to defend 
a trial that he was not ready to begin, but grateful for the 
trial court's offer to temporarily defer cross-examination, the 
Franchisor's counsel did what any prudent advocate would do: he 
-4-
acceded to the trial court's view that a three-day continuance be 
granted. (Tr. at R. 5243-44) . To equate that decision—a deci-
sion made on the fourth day of trial—with a voluntary waiver of 
a motion argued four days earlier is tortured at best, ludicrous 
at worst. There simply is no basis for the Franchisee's claim 
that the Franchisor's acceptance of a three-day continuance near 
the end of trial constitutes a ". . . waive[r] of the motion for 
continuance by stipulation." (Appellee's Brief at 27). 
In the final analysis, it is undisputed that the Fran-
chisee acted in bad faith in withholding the Miller Report, the 
Miller Work Papers and the Franchisee Work Papers. It is also 
undisputed that these documents were crucial to the case: they 
were the sole quantitative basis for the jury's decision that the 
Franchisor underpaid commissions of $35,926.06. In the Franchi-
see's own words, the documents were "the core of the wrongs in 
this case." (Appellee's Brief at 72). As such, there can be no 
doubt that the Franchisor was irrevocably prejudiced in its abil-
ity to refute the Franchisee's commission claims at trial. The 
trial court abused its discretion in not granting the Franchisor 
a reasonable continuance in which to assimilate and rebut the 
Franchisee's accounting documents. The Court should vacate the 
jury's award of $35,926.06 and remand the issue of unpaid commis-
sions for a new trial. 
-5-
2. The Jury's Contradictory Verdicts Entitle the 
Franchisor to Either a New Trial or an Order 
Striking the More Generalized Findings that Favor 
the Franchisee. 
The Franchisee admits that the jury made an "apparently 
contradictory ruling" by awarding the Franchisee liquidated dam-
ages on contracts that the jury simultaneously determined were 
1 
unenforceable, (Appellee's Brief at 8) . In cin effort to sal-
vage the verdicts that favor him, the Franchisee argues that the 
Court should apply Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah 
App. 1990) and simply strike the jury verdicts that favor the 
Franchisor. (Appellee's Brief at 3 0) . There are, however, at 
least two problems with this approach. 
First, the Franchisee failed to seek or obtain from the 
jury any of the detailed information necessary to ascertain what 
the jury actually intended. In Wright, the trial judge performed 
that function. 787 P.2d at 516. In this case, neither the trial 
court nor the parties did so. That failure is fatal to the Fran-
chisee's suggestion that the trial court should have summarily 
excised the jury's liquidated damages award to the Franchisor. 
Second, the Franchisee ignores the fact that in this 
case, the Franchisee's obligation under the Frcinchise Agreements 
1
 In a related context, the Franchisee argues that these ver-
dicts created a "tremendous conflict." (Appellee's Brief at 62). 
-6-
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verdicts] cannot be reconciled, as in this case, the more spe-
cific finding must govern the outcome." 787 P. 2d at 516. In 
this case, the jury's special verdicts (as embodied in paragraphs 
14-18 of the Franchisee's Judgment) purport to release the Fran-
chisee from all his obligations under the parties' contracts. 
(R. 3890) . These jury findings are far more general than the 
jury's specific finding that the Franchisor is entitled to 
enforce and recover liquidated damages for the Franchisee's 
breach of the narrow confidentiality provisions of the Franchise 
Agreements. The trial court erred in refusing to allow "the more 
specific finding to govern the outcome." Wright, 787 P.2d at 
516. This Court, therefore, should either strike the more gen-
eral verdicts that favor the Franchisee or remand the case for a 
new trial. 
-8-
3. The Jury's Award of $50,000 on. the Franchisee's 
Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Cannot Stand Under Utah 
Law. 
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Franchisor readily concedes that each of these 3 3 evidentiary 
predicates constitute some support for the commission award—an 
award that the Franchisor is not challenging. However, only six 
of the 3 3 cited pieces of evidence relate to the Paragraph 8 Ser-
vices award: paragraph 11 (pertaining to the manner in which the 
Franchisor priced its parts and extracted a so-called "extra 
materials charge"), paragraph 13 (pertaining to the Franchisor's 
tracking of leads on second inspection commissions), paragraph 15 
(pertaining to the amount that the Franchisor spent on advertis-
3 ing during one of the three years of the parties' association), 
paragraph 21 (same), paragraph 27 (pertaining to "extra materials 
charge"), and paragraph 3 0 (pertaining to the Franchisee's testi-
mony that he paid the Franchisor $158,206 for bookkeeping, 
accounting and related services under the Franchise Agreement). 
These are the only evidentiary predicates that pertain to the 
Paragraph 8 Services award. 
3
 There is no provision of the Franchise Agreements that 
requires the Franchisor to spend any fixed amount on any particu-
lar type of Paragraph 8 Service, including advertising. As a 
matter of law, the good faith and fair dealing principle cannot 
be used to imply a contrary obligation. See Rio Algom Corp. v. 
Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("an expressed agree-
ment or covenant relating to a specific contract right excludes 
the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contra-
dictory nature.") Because this is a legal issue, the Franchisor 
is not obligated to marshal and explain the facts that underlie 
it. 
-10-
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for unpaid commissions), and (iii) Trial Exh. P-ll, a chart 
admitted solely for illustrative purposes, Tr. at R. 4521-22, 
which summarized the Franchisee's calculations of the amounts to 
which he believed he was entitled for unperformed Paragraph 8 
Services. This evidence falls fall short of creating the "ratio-
nal basis" required by Utah law to support a damage award. 
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). The award must 
be vacated. 
(b) By the Terms of the Jury's Own Special Ver-
dicts, The Award of $5,891.3 5 to the Franchi-
see for the Franchisor's Breach of Contract 
Claims Set the Outer Limit on the Total 
Amount of Damages Recoverable on Those 
Claims. Those Damages Can Not Be Augmented 
by Resort to the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The Franchisee accurately observes that ". . . as an 
independent cause of action, the implied covenant of fair dealing 
and good faith in contracts carries it's [sic] own right of dam-
ages." (Appellee's Brief at 43). What the Franchisee fails to 
understand, however, is that "an expressed agreement or covenant 
relating to a specific contract right excludes the possibility of 
an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature." Rio 
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. , 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). In 
other words, "there is no violation of the duty of good faith, as 
a matter of law, wiien a party is simply exercising its 
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Here, the ob] i gati oi I to perforin, the Paragraph. 8 Ser-
vices arose nndei an express provision ot the Franchise Aqree---
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4 The Franchisor is the "Prevailing Party71' on the 
Parties ' Breach of Contract Claims for_Purposes of 
Recovering His Attorneys / Fees. 
T1 I e F i: a n c h i s e e c o r r e c t .1 y s t a. t e s 11 I a t o i I .] y t ii e 
" party i n whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered becomes 
the preva i.,1 1 ng party, " enti t] ed to attorney's fees. ( A.ppel 1 ee' s 
Bri ef e t * 18) W':i I::l: I i: i :: am: :i,a.] y s:i s , .1: lowev ei: , t:,l le F ranchisee s bates 
that /:j [h] i s [ total ] damages were $9] , 000 : Ii i doing so, the 
Franchisee nowhere di ffpr°ntiates between damages a] 3 ocab] e tc: 
1 i.i s breach c • f contraci j.ains an.d d.a.mages a 1 1 oca,b] e to hi s toi: t 
-.] 3 
claims. This allocation is crucial: the Franchisee's total 
5 
recovery for breach of the Franchise Agreements is $5,891.35; 
5
 The Franchisee offers no analysis to support its apparent 
view that the $50,000 award for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing constitutes a part of its total 
recovery for breach of contract. For at least three reasons, 
these damages sound in tort. 
First, the Franchisee pleaded his implied covenant claim in 
tort; he even sought the imposition of punitive damages on this 
claim, R. 1366(a), clearly disclosing the tort nature of his 
claim. See e.g. Gaqon v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 775 
P.2d 325 (Utah 1988). (". . . a plaintiff is not entitled to put 
on evidence of punitive damages unless he or she can make out a 
sufficient case to go to the jury on an independent tort the-
ory .") 
Second, under applicable California law, if five character-
istics are satisfied, breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair deailing sounds in tort. According to Wallis v. 
Superior Ct. , 160 Cal. App. 3rd 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. 
1984), these characteristics are: 
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in 
inherently unequal bargaining positions; 
(2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a 
non-profit motivation, i.e. , to secure peace of 
mind, security, future protection; 
(3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate, 
because (a) they do not require the party in the 
superior position to account for its action, and 
(b) they do not make the inferior party "whole"; 
(4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the 
type of harm it may suffer and of necessity places 
trust in the other party to perform; and 
(5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Although the California Supreme Court held in Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp. , 7 65 P. 2d 3 73 (Cal. 1988) that the usua 1 
employment relationship does not normal ly exhibit these charac-
teristics, at least three post-Foley cases interpret Foley to 
characterize an Implied, covenant claim, as sounding in tort so 
long as the parties are i n a. fiduciary relationship. Mitsui 
Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 2 60 Cal. Rptr. 793, 7 9 5-9 6 (Cal. App. 
1989) ("Foley, impliedly if not expressly, li mits the abili ty to 
recover tort damages in breach, of contract situations to those 
where the respective positions of the contracting parties have 
the fiduciary characteristics of that relationship between the 
insurer and insured."); Careau & Co, v. Security Pacific Business 
Credit, Inc. , 222 Ca 1. App. 3rd 1371 (Ca 11 App. 19 9 0) (Foley 
". . did suggest that it is still an open question as to 
whether* 'the special i: el ationship model is an appropriate one to 
follow in determining whether to expand tort recovery.'") ; Price 
v. Wells-Farqo Bank, 2.13 Ca] App. 3rd 4 65, 2 6.2 Cal. Rptr. 73 5 
(Cal. App. 1.989) (''until the Supreme Court says otherwise, j t may 
st i 1 1. be argued that a non- i nsurance contract was "tort i ous ly 
breached if it contained characteristics similar to those wh,i ch 
allow a findi ng of tortious breach in an i nsurance contract.") 
In this case, tl: le jury determined that the Franchise Agree-
ments created a fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
(R. 3.233). The Franchisee himself testi fied that he. entered into 
the Franchise Agreements to obtain security and peace of mind. 
(Tr. at R. 4557-58). Accordingly, it appears that the $50,000 
award for breach of the impli ed covenant of good, faith and fa ir 
dealing sounds m tort and may not be included in reckoning the 
net success of the parties on their respective breach of contract 
clai ms. At _ \ .-• • this issue should be remanded to the 
trial court ior a spec i : ; • ! i -iir-.n a^ - t -.. r.hn- precise com.pos.iti on 
of this award. 
to all attorneys' fees reasonably incurred on those claims. The 
amount of such fees should be determined on remand. 
5. The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Enforce the 
Notes Against the Franchisee. 
The Franchisee does not dispute in his brief that he 
signed and delivered three Notes in the aggregate principal 
amount of $115,000; that it was stipulated that the Franchisor 
had established a prime facie case for the imposition of liabil-
ity on the Notes in a sum equal to $115,000 less all proven pay-
ments; and that the trial court never explained its rationale for 
denying the Franchisor's motion for judgment on the Notes. 
(Appellee's Brief at 49-51). Rather, the Franchisee lamely 
observes that: 
[The Franchisor] should be forced by this 
Court to answer if it has resold the territo-
ries that are the subject of the purchase by 
the Notes. If [the Franchisor] has this is a 
moot issue. It is likely moot because [the 
Franchisor] has the territories back under 
any circumstance and can or has resold such 
territories." 
(Appellee's Brief at 49). 
The Franchisee's response is unpersuasive and unrealis-
tic for several reasons. First, the Franchisee failed to produce 
at trial any evidence regarding the Franchisor's efforts, if any, 
to resell the franchise territories. The absence of such evi-
dence precludes it from being considered or speculated about on 
-16-
appeal Second, the Franchisor is unawrire ot any basis on which 
i f rani tn< n impp 1 I CHI II 11 " M V V I M " I N I h i 1 i ".' mi HI . i ppn . i l '"I'll"! i s 
C o u r t , of n e c e s s i t y , i s not in tin* b u s i m \ s s o f q e n e i a t i nq s u p p I e -
m e n t a ] f a c t u a 1 records to cur e defici encies that a party created 
b e ] oto N e x t . i I'M I« I .unt i l i set" • i i ; l " at .emnnl t hri l i.Mf I i <IIKIn i st-1 I < >L 
rltori es *:< iii i nnw wor't I*i $200, 000 " is unsupported by any 
citation to the record and nil ist be disregarded, 
F i n a ] ] i I: 11: I e F i: a i i cl :i :i s e e c omp ] «e t e ] y f a i ] s t • ::> i: e s p o i i :i t o 
the Franchisor's content! on that the Franchisee's receipt of com-
pensatory damages made h :i m who] e under h i s contracts with the 
Frai ich iii sor Tl lose damages i: esu] ted iii :i I til: le Franch isee's recei pt 
of the benefi t of h i s contractual bargai n If the Franchisee is 
further relieved from the ob3 i gati on of payi ng for hi s f ran 
chi ses, an i mpermi ssi I::>] e doi ib] e recovery wi 1 1 occur. The F r an-
c h i s e e w i ] ] n o t o n ] y r e c e i v e c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r h i s c 1 a i m e d ] o s s e s, 
h e w_i.ii * I p. • . •" 
t o nav f -i vdiiL- < f i , , , itj J o Hi,,. wtr --t^ r . eu 
f r o r t h e Kr.i ' i i n s - :.**r,e b e n e t r ^ • • t _* <.-.i_^ _ >'_ _t..u ._:_^ 
a b l e . ( See i.t p• , * : 
Thi s Coi u: t s h o i i l d r t
 v*u s t • r i a.! c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o 
e n f o r c e t h e Notei- ami e n t e r judgment t u r t h e F r a n c h i s o r i i i t h e 
i p a 1 t'i tin i l l 111 i l l in I ! J I in I in il I i t » M I . 
6. The Franchisee's Blatant Violation of the Golden 
Rule of Trial Tactics Entitles the Franchisor to a 
New Trial. 
To extricate himself from the fatal effect of his 
improper trial tactic, the Franchisee lashes out with a series of 
pejorative labels, calling the Franchisor "predatory" and its 
argument "frivolous." (Appellee's Brief at 52). The Franchi-
see's obvious defensiveness on this issue is understandable; it 
is not, however, remotely responsive to the Franchisor's conten-
tion that its rights were impaired by counsel's admonition to the 
jury to place itself in the Franchisee's shoes in determining 
whether he was forced unfairly to go into debt under the Fran-
chise Agreements. The Franchisee's attempted defense of his vio-
lation of the Golden Rule trial tactic is unpersuasive. 
First, the Franchisee suggests that his Golden Rule 
argument was directed solely to the issue of whether the Franchi-
see was the victim of duress in entering into the Franchise 
Agreements. (Appellee's Brief at 52) . The jury, however, by 
being urged to place itself in the position of the Franchisee and 
by hearing the trial judge endorse this as permissible "argu-
ment," was effectively given carte blanche authority to relieve 
the Franchisee from any obligations under the Franchise 
Agreements—a result that most any juror would likely reach if 
told to view the issue solely from the perspective of the 
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objective facts are present such as (i) counsel makes a timely 
objection, (ii) counsel seeks curative action, (iii) no jury 
instructions are given to disregard the improper argument, 
(iv) the argument is not withdrawn by counsel, (v) the argument 
is not justified in response to earlier remarks by the objecting 
counsel, and (vi) the trial court refuses to grant a suitable 
remittitur. See G. Stein, Closing Argument, § 60, at 159 (1985). 
Viewed in the light of these objective facts, and given 
the reality that the jury did precisely what counsel asked—it 
placed itself in the Franchisee's position and relieved the Fran-
chisee of its contractual obligations to the Franchisor—it is 
clear that the Franchisee's tactics unfairly prejudiced the 
Franchisor. The Franchisor accordingly is entitled to a new 
trial. 
7. The Trial Court Erred in Dissolving the Temporary 
Injunction. 
As an alternative to entering a permanent injunction 
consistent with the jury's findings that the Franchisor's cus-
tomer list was valuable, was reasonably protected, and was ille-
gally exploited, the trial court directed the Franchisee to make 
a so-called "equitable payment" of $11,014 to the Franchisor. 
-20-
(R. 3728) . Charitably stated, the trial court's action was 
unorthodox and unsolicited. At a minimum, the trial court should 
be required to explain why it applied a remedy that neither party 
requested and why it rejected the conventional relief that the 
Franchisee specifically sought—the issuance of a permanent 
injunction. 
The Franchisor's right to a permanent injunction is 
compelling. The jury specifically determined that the 
Franchisor's customer list had substantial, independent economic 
value from being confidential; that the Franchisor reasonably 
protected the secrecy of the customer list; that the Franchisee 
improperly exploited the Franchisor's customer list; and that the 
Franchisor suffered significant damages as a result of that 
exploitation. (R. 3192-94). The jury determined, therefore, 
that the confidentiality provisions of the Franchise Agreements 
are binding upon and enforceable against the Franchisee. As 
such, the trial court erred in refusing to permanently enjoin the 
Franchisee from further exploitation of the customer list. The 
Court should remand this issue with instructions either to make 
6
 Even the Franchisee objected to this action. (See e.g. Appel-
lee's Brief at 70) ("Neither party requested equitable relief as 
imposed by the Court. The Court came up with the solution on its 
own. . . The trial court made no findings to identify any legal 
standard it relied upon to justify awarding equitable relief to 
[the Franchisor].") 
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the preliminary injunction permanent or conduct a new trial to 
determine and quantify damages that the Franchisor has sustained 
since the first trial. 
II. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
A. ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Require the 
Franchisor to Perform and Pay for an Accounting in 
Advance of Trial. To the Extent The Trial Court 
Initially Erred in that Decision, the Franchisee's 
Receipt of Damages for the Franchisor's Failure to 
Provide the Required Accounting Services and the 
Franchisee's Failure to Adduce at Trial Any Evi-
dence of the Costs of Such Services is Fatal to 
his Recovery. 
The Franchisee claims that the trial court incorrectly 
refused to require the Franchisor to provide an accounting in 
advance of trial. (Appellee's Brief at 54-56) . To support that 
claim, the Franchisee argues that paragraphs 8(c)-(e) of the 
Franchise Agreements impose an obligation to provide an account-
ing beyond that which the Franchisor already provided. Id. 
There are, however, at least three reasons why the Franchisee's 
claim is without merit. 
First, at the time the trial court denied the Franchi-
see's motion for an accounting—some eight months before trial— 
there was no factual or legal indication that the parties were in 
anything other thain an arms-length commercial contract devoid of 
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fiduciary responsibilities. In the face of these facts and 
legal principles, the trial court allowed the Franchisee's fidu-
ciary duty claim to go to the jury. The jury concluded that a 
fiduciary duty was owed and breached for which nominal damages of 
one dollar ($1.00) were awarded. (R. 3233a). Once the jury 
reached that conclusion, however, it was incumbent upon the Fran-
chisee to petition the trial court to vacate or modify its ear-
lier decision not to compel an accounting. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
(". . . the order or other form of [a previous] decision is sub-
ject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
7
 For example, the Franchisee never pleaded a claim for con-
structive fraud or other relief which, if established, would 
shift the burden of persuasion to the Franchisor to prove the 
good faith and reasonableness of its conduct, generally, and 
impose an obligation to account, specifically. Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1984); In re Swan's Estate, 
293 P.2d 682, 693 (Utah 1956). Moreover, California law is set-
tled that the relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee 
is merely contractual and not fiduciary. Boat & Motor Mart v. 
Sea Ray Boats, Inc., CCH Business Franchise Guide Reporter, 
5 8847 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying California law); Premier Wine & 
Spirits v. E&J Gallo Winery, id. at f 9106 (9th Cir. 1988) ; 
Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Cal. 1951). This is 
consistent with numerous other jurisdictions. See e.g. Mr. 
Steak, Inc. v. Belveue Steak, Inc. , 555 P.2d 179, 182 (Colo. 
1976) ; Adams Parker Furniture, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., CCH 
Business Franchise Guide Reporter, f 9413 (D. Kan. 1987). 
Finally, paragraph 16 of the Franchise Agreements fortifies 
the conclusion that the parties were not in a fiduciary relation-
ship: "This agreement shall not be construed as creating an 
agency, joint venture or partnership relationship between the 
parties. . . ." 
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adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all 
the parties.") The Franchisee's failure to take this action 
constitutes a waiver of any rights it once had; that failure can-
not now be rectified on appeal. 
Next, the provisions of the Franchise Agreements on 
which the Franchisee bases its argument—paragraphs 8(c)-(e)—are 
the very basis on which the jury elected to award damages of 
$50,000 on the Franchisee's claim for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. (See Appellant's Brief at 
14-16, 32-35; Appellant's Reply Brief at 9-12, supra). This 
award was intended to compensate the Franchisee for his supposed 
failure to receive the Paragraph 8 Services. Id. The principal 
aspect of these Services was the obligation to provide full and 
accurate financial accountings. Thus, the Franchisee's receipt 
of these damages compensates it for any abridgement of his rights 
under paragraph 8 of the Franchise Agreements—including the 
right to receive an accounting. To now augment that recovery 
through the Franchisee's separate claim for an accounting would 
result in an impermissible double recovery. 
Finally, the Franchisee claims that it is 
"unbelievabl[e]" that the trial court did not require the 
Franchisor to pay for tihe Franchisee's accounting expert. (Appel-
lee's Brief at 56). The trial court's decision is eminently 
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"believable," however, given the clear fact that the Franchisee 
failed to adduce at trial any evidence regarding the amount, if 
any, that his accountant charged or which the Franchisee paid for 
Q 
those services. The absence of any factual record establishing 
this vital fact is fatal to the Franchisee's effort to recover 
the value, if any, of his accountant's services. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the Franchi-
see's Federal and State Racketeering Claims. 
As the Franchisee correctly states, the Franchisor 
filed multiple motions to dismiss the Franchisee's federal and 
state racketeering claims (collectively, the "Racketeering 
Claims"). (Appellee's Brief at 57). The Franchisor sought dis-
missal of the Racketeering Claims on four separate grounds: 
(i) the Franchisee's failure to plead the Racketeering Claims 
with particularity, (ii) the Franchisee's failure to allege the 
existence of a legally cognizable "enterprise," (iii) the Fran-
chisee's failure to allege the existence of a legally cognizable 
"pattern" of unlawful activity, and (iv) the Franchisee's failure 
to invoke the California racketeering statute in the manner con-
templated by the parties' contractual choice of law provision. 
(R. 725-33). Although the Franchisor concedes that the trial 
8
 The Franchisor noted this defect in its opening brief. (See 
Appellant's Brief at 33-34, n.21.) The Franchisee failed to 
respond to this point in his brief. 
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court's decision to dismiss the Racketeering Claims solely on the 
choice of law provision is not, by itself, defensible, its deci-
sion must be affirmed if there is any other legally sufficient 
basis in the record to support the decision. Baqshaw v. Bagshaw, 
788 P. 2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) (lower court's judgment may 
be affirmed if the "decision can be sustained on any proper legal 
basis.") (quoting Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P. 2d 163, 169 
(Utah App. 1989)). In this case, at least three legally suffi-
cient grounds exist. 
(a) The Franchisee Failed to Plead With Particu-
larity the Elements of a UPUAA Violation. 
"Racketeering" charges, carrying as they do a powerful 
stigma and the threat of multiple damages, may not be made 
lightly. Charges of this type must be made with at least the 
factual specificity required for pleading fraud. Accordingly, 
courts consistently have applied the requirements of Rule 9(b) in 
racketeering cases. See generally Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO 
Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 55, 90-92. 
As the court in Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 
n.55 (D. Colo. 1984) aptly noted: 
A RICO defendant also needs to be protected 
from unscrupulous claimants lured by the 
prospect of treble damages, and it should be 
the policy of the law, within the procedural 
constraints of our system, to provide this 
protection. . . . RICO should not be con-
strued to give a pleader license to bully and 
intimidate, nor to fire salvos from a loose 
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cannon. Irresponsible or inadequately con-
sidered allegations should be met with severe 
sanctions . . . 
At bottom, a plaintiff's "Pavlovian inclusion of a [racketeering] 
claim need not induce an equally Pavlovian acceptance of that 
claim by [the Courts. ]" Huss v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 635 F. 
Supp. 1227, 1228 (N.D. 111. 1986). 
The Utah federal district court has been a leader in 
applying Rule 9(b) strictly to cases involving alleged "racke-
teering offenses." In Grant v. Union Bank# 629 F. Supp. 570, 576 
(D. Utah 1986) , the court set forth the standard by which RICO 
and analogous racketeering allegations should be judged: 
[B]ecause the RICO statute is based upon 
criminality it seems appropriate that the 
pleadings be sufficiently particular to show 
the indictability of the alleged offender. 
We consider this to be an appropriate 
requirement in view of the statutory language 
and the far reaching sanctions of RICO. 
See also Bache Halsey Stewart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank 
& Trust Co. , 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah 1983) (requiring 
allegations sufficient to establish "probable cause to believe 
the named defendant committed the alleged predicate crimes"). 
Since the UPUAA similarly incorporates criminal stat-
utes in its definition of "unlawful activity," the same pleading 
standards should be applied to the state statute. See generally 
Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Utah 
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198 6) (Applying RICO pleading standards to UPUAA). Unlike the 
federal RICO statute, which does not explicitly contain a plead-
ing requirement, the UPUAA contains a specific subsection which, 
in essence, statutorily incorporates and enhances Rule 9(b)'s 
standard. That section specifically requires that "the elements 
of each claim or cause of action shall be stated with particular-
ity against each defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1605(7) 
(1988 Supp.) (emphasis added). 
In other words, the UPUAA specifically provides that 
the particularity in pleading requirement applies to all of the 
"elements of each claim or cause of action." ^d. Thus, as to 
each of the elements of its claims against the Franchisor under 
the UPUAA, the Franchisee must be held to a standard of fact-spe-
cific and particularized pleading; broad-brush statements, asser-
tions that do not differentiate among defendants, and conclusory 
labels will not suffice. The Franchisee's failure to conform to 
this requirement in his Second Amended Complciint, R. 13 3 2-65, 
justifies the trial court's dismissal of the Racketeering Claims. 
(b) The Franchisee Failed to Allege the Necessary 
"Enterprise". 
The Franchisees Racketeering Claims were properly dis-
missed for yet another, independent reason: the Franchisee did 
not plead the existence of a separate "enterprise" under the 
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UPUAA. The showing of a distinct "enterprise" is indispensable 
to any racketeering claim: 
The central role of the concept of enterprise 
under RICO cannot be overstated. It is pre-
cisely the criminal infiltration and manipu-
lation of organizational structures that cre-
ated the problems which led to the passage of 
RICO. 
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986). 
This case presents an alleged "individual" or 
"association-in-fact" enterprise. That is, the Franchisee did 
not allege that the "enterprise" was some pre-existing institu-
tion or body, but rather that it consisted of the individual 
defendants—the Franchisee and the Franchisee's district 
manager—acting individually, in concert or associating for a 
particular purpose. (R. 1332-33). In such cases, courts have 
insisted that the association-in-fact have an "ascertainable 
structure" separate and apart from the pattern of activity in 
which it allegedly engaged. See United States v. Anderson, 62 6 
F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1040 
(1983) . 
In United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 661, 665 (8th 
Cir. 1983), the Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), expressed the 
"ascertainable structure" reguirement this way: 
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[A racketeering] enterprise must have an 
'ascertainable structure' distinct from that 
inherent in the conduct of a pattern of rack-
eteering activity. This distinct structure 
might be demonstrated by proof that a group 
engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or 
that it has an organizational pattern or sys-
tem of authority beyond what was necessary to 
perpetrate the predicate crimes. 
(Citations omitted). And in United States v. Anderson, supra, 
626 F.2d at 1372, that court further stated: 
We hold that Congress intended that the 
phrases 'a group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity," as used in 
its definition of the term 'enterprise' in 
[the RICO statute], to encompass only associ-
ations having an ascertainable structure 
which exist for the purpose of maintaining 
operations directed toward an economic goal 
that has an existence that can be defined 
apart from the commission of the predicate 
acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.'9 
9
 These holdings are in accord with other jurisdictions. See, 
e.g. , Montesano v. Seaf irst Commercial Corp. , 818 F.2d 42 3, 427 
(5th Cir. 1987) ("association-in-fact enterprisers, like corporate 
or partnership enterprises, must have an ongoing organization or 
be a continuing unit, such that the enterprise has an existence 
that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate 
acts"); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 62:8, 631 (4th Cir. 
1985); Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 625 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 
(N.D. 111. 1985), aff'd, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986); Allinqton 
v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 478 (CD. Cal. 1985) ("enterprise 
must have an existence 'separate and apart from the pattern of 
activity in which it engaged'") (quoting Turkette, supra, 452 
U.S. at 583); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., supra, 582 F. Supp. at 
1303-05 (summarizing case law). 
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The UPUAA has a similar definition of "enterprise," see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) (Supp. 1988), and the Utah Supreme 
Court has cited the Turkette decision with approval in interpret-
ing the enterprise definition in UPUAA's predecessor statute. 
See State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988). 
This requirement of "an existence separate and apart 
from the pattern of racketeering activity" has been interpreted 
further to require the allegation of facts demonstrating "conti-
nuity of structure or personnel." Laterza v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("plaintiff's gen-
eral assertion that the combination of defendants constitutes an 
'enterprise' . . . without allegations as to continuity of struc-
ture or personnel will be stricken unless supporting factual 
allegations are included in the amended complaint"). 
The Franchisee's Second Amended Complaint failed to 
allege any "continuity of structure or personnel." Indeed, the 
Franchisee failed to allege an enterprise that had any 
"ascertainable structure" whatever. All that is alleged is that 
the Franchisee and its manager formed or are the enterprise. 
This is legally insufficient. The Second Amended Complaint's 
failure to adequately allege a legally cognizable "enterprise" is 
yet another reason why the Racketeering Claims were properly 
dismissed. 
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3 • The Franchisee did not Plead Facts Sufficient to 
Show That the Franchisee Engaged in any "Pattern" 
of Unlawful Activity. 
The "pattern" necessary to sustain a racketeering suit 
involves considerably more than the commission of the requisite 
three predicate offenses under the UPUAA. Rather, as the Supreme 
Court explained in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
496 n.14 (1985), the predicate offenses must be continuous and 
related to one another. 
As the Senate Report explained: 'The target 
of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The 
infiltration of legitimate business normally 
requires more than one 'racketeering 
activity' and the threat of continuing activ-
ity to be effective. It is the factor of 
continuity plus relationship which combines 
to produce a pattern.' S. Rep. No. 91-617, 
p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). 
See also Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 
1987) ("Sedima thus makes clear that a RICO violation requires 
continuous and related racketeering acts") (emphasis added); 
Thompson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc.f 652 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (D. 
Utah 1987) (same); Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, supra, 645 F. 
Supp. at 425-26 (same). 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that continuity 
and relationship remain the touchstones for establishing a "pat-
tern" under RICO. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
492 U.S. 229 (1989). The Supreme Court's analysis of the 
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"pattern" of racketeering necessary for a viable RICO claim 
applies with equal force to the "pattern" of unlawful activity 
required under the UPUAA. Indeed, the statutory language of the 
UPUAA explicitly incorporates the elements of continuity and 
relationship articulated by the Court in Sedima and now reaf-
firmed in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, supra. Section 1602(2) 
defines a "pattern" of unlawful activity to mean: 
(1) the commission of at least three 
criminal episodes; 
(2) those episodes must be related, not 
isolated; 
(3) taken together, the episodes must 
demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(3) (1988 Supp.) (Emphasis added). 
Because the Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any 
allegation of the requirement of continuity and relationship, it 
fails to state a legally cognizable "pattern." The trial court 
correctly dismissed the Racketeering Claims. 
4. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Any Evidence of 
the Franchisee/s Alleged Loss of Profits. 
The Franchisee argues that the trial court erred in 
excluding evidence of lost profits. (Appellee's Brief at 60-63). 
The court's decision, however, is warranted for several reasons. 
First, the Franchisee failed to plead an entitlement to lost 
profits in the manner required by Utah law. Rule 9(g) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "when items of special 
damages are claimed, they shall be specifically stated," If they 
are not specifically stated, it is reversible error to award such 
damages. Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954), Like most 
jurisdictions, Utah treats lost profits as an item of special 
damage because they are not a necessary, natural or routine 
result of an alleged breach of contract. Cohn v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975); Security Title Co. v. Hunt, 
337 P.2d 718, 719-20 (Utah 1959); Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d at 
459. As such, the party against whom lost profits are sought is 
entitled to clear notice of that claim. Id. 
In the face of these principles, the Franchisee con-
cedes that nowhere in the 250 pages of his initial Complaint, his 
two Amended Complaints or his More Definite Statement is there 
any express mention of his intent to seek damages for lost prof-
its. (Appellee's Brief at 60) . To rationalize that omission, 
10 the Franchisee points to a brief snippet of a single paragraph 
11 
of his Second Amended Complaint. _Id. That paragraph appears 
in the Franchisee's conversion claim—a claim that seeks damages 
1 0
 The Franchisee in his brief mistakenly refers to this para-
graph (paragraph 13 9) as page 13 9. 
1 1
 Paragraph 139 alleges in pertinent part that the Franchisor 
recklessly or intentionally failed to pay commissions and 
". . . wrongfully obtained an injunction prohibiting plaintiff 
from servicing his accounts." (Tr. at R. 1369). 
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for the Franchisor's alleged failure to properly compute and pay 
earned and accrued sales commissions. The conversion claim does 
not seek damages for future lost profits. Indeed, paragraph 141 
of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that as a result of the 
Franchisor's "intentional conversion," the Franchisee suffered 
". . . injury and damages in an amount equal to the commissions 
which should have been paid, the correct and agreed-to charges 
for parts and materials, and interest thereon." (R. 137 0) 
(emphasis added). Neither that nor any other paragraph alleges a 
right to unpaid income beyond "the commissions which should have 
been paid." Because the only unpaid income to which the Franchi-
see claims an entitlement are the very sales commissions that the 
jury awarded him on his conversion and breach of contract claims, 
the Franchisee has been fully compensated for all losses for 
which he pleaded. 
In addition, the Franchisee's reliance on the allega-
tion that the Injunction was wrongfully issued is unavailing 
given the trial court's ultimate determination that it was not. 
The Franchisee concedes this fact in his brief. (See Appellee's 
Brief at 61: "The Court refused to grant damages to [the Franchi-
see] as a result [of] his request for declaratory relief for what 
apparently was the Court's finding that the injunction was not 
wrongfully entered.") The moment the injunction was determined 
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not to have been wrongfully issued, therefore, the only arguably 
12 pleaded basis for the recovery of lost profits vanished. Thus, 
even if the Franchisor had properly pleaded a claim for lost 
profits flowing from the issuance of the Injunction, the court's 
conclusion that the Injunction was not wrongfully issued pre-
cludes an award of lost profits. 
5. The Franchisee's Failure to Adduce Any Evidence of 
the Franchisor's Financial Net Worth is Fatal Both 
to the Jury's Punitive Damage Award of $5f872.36 
and to the Recovery of Any Additional Punitive 
Damages. 
(a) The Court Should Strike the $5,872.36 Award. 
Punitive damages are available under Utah law only 
where there is "willful and malicious conduct or conduct which 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disre-
gard of, the rights of others." Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospi-
tal, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). Of the many factors 
to be considered in assessing the amount of punitive damages, the 
cases uniformly identify the relative wealth of the defendant as 
among the most important. See e.g. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991); Bundy v. Century Eguip-
ment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
1 2
 That the Injunction was not wrongfully issued and, indeed, 
should have been made permanent is established in Appellant's 
Brief at 46-48, and Appellant's Reply Brief, supra at 20-22. 
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P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). If the record is devoid of evidence 
of the defendant's relative wealth, punitive damages are not sus-
tainable. Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759; Nelson v. Jacobson# 669 P.2d 
1207, 1219 (Utah 1983) (". . . the award of $25,000 in punitive 
damages in this case could not be sustained in any event because 
it was entered without adducing any evidence or making any find-
ings of fact regarding defendant's net worth or income."); Cruz 
v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) (where there was no evidence 
of defendant's assets or net worth, punitive damages imposed by 
jury could not stand). 
In this case, the Franchisee adduced no evidence of the 
Franchisor's net worth, despite the fact that the trial court 
expressly ruled that to the extent he was able to establish a 
prima facie case for the imposition of such damages, he could 
present such evidence to the jury. (Tr. at R. 4318). The Fran-
chisee simply forgot to do so. The Court should accordingly 
strike the punitive damage award of $5,872.36. 
(b) The Court Should Not Grant a New Trial Solely 
on the Issue of Punitive Damages. 
The Franchisee argues for a new trial solely on the 
issue of punitive damages. (Appellee's Brief at 65). This is a 
hopelessly unrealistic and uneconomical remedy in this case. 
Given the factual and legal complexity of the parties' claims and 
defenses and the remarkable extent to which the parties claim the 
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trial court erred at almost every stage of the litigation, a sep-
arate trial solely on the issue of punitive damages makes no 
sense. This case can be coherently adjudicated only through a 
plenary trial of all issues. Such an adjudication must consider 
the many factors relevant to assessing the availability and 
amount of punitive damages: (i) the relative wealth of the defen-
dant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts 
and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect 
thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the proba-
bility of future occurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relation-
ship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages 
awarded. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d at 8 08; 
Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759. 
It is clear, therefore, that any determination of puni-
tive damages will require an extensive and complicated assessment 
of hotly disputed evidence regarding the quality of the 
Franchisor's conduct, the facts and circumstcinces surrounding 
that conduct and the relationship between the parties. These 
assessments cannot be made in a vacuum devoid of these vitally 
important factors. The Franchisee's suggestion that the Court 
simply grant a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages 
is plainly impractical. The Franchisee will have to reestablish 
and meaningfully summarize all of the evidence relevant to his 
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claim for punitive damages. The Franchisor will of necessity 
have to adduce extensive, additional evidence to rebut that 
claim. Much of this evidence—such as the Franchisor's financial 
condition, the nature of the alleged misconduct, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding such conduct and the probability of 
future occurrence of the misconduct—has not yet been developed 
given the trial court's decision to bifurcate and defer the issue 
of punitive damages. The presentation of such evidence will 
require untold days of trial time. The salutary objectives of 
judicial economy would be thwarted by conducting a bifurcated 
trial on punitive damages separate from a new trial on the many 
. . 13 
issues of liability and compensatory damages. See Van Dyke v. 
Mountain Coin Machine, Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah App. 1988) 
(new trial should not be ordered where it is not efficient or 
economical to do so). 
1 3
 Of course, it is the Franchisor's position that the trial 
court committed so many reversible errors at almost every con-
ceivable point in this proceeding as to require a new trial of 
all issues in the case. If all issues need to be retried, con-
siderations of judicial economy become irrelevant. Those consid-
erations are relevant, however, in evaluating the appropriateness 
of a new trial solely on the issue of punitive damages. 
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6. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Grant the 
Franchisee's Motions for Directed Verdict, for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for 
Declaratory Relief. 
In ruling on motions for directed verdict and for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the trial court is obliged to look at the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light 
favorable to the party moved against; and the 
granting of such a motion is justified only 
if, in so viewing the evidence, there is no 
substantial basis therein which would support 
a verdict in his favor. On appeal, in con-
sidering the trial court's granting of such 
motions, we look at the evidence in the same 
manner. 
Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 917 
(Utah 1979). Importantly, in order "to demonstrate that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the one chal-
lenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d at 799. 
The Franchisee ignores these principles. While paying 
lip service to the proposition that his motions ". . . are 
reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard" that require him 
to marshal the evidence, see Appellee's Brief at 65, the Franchi-
see argues with no citation to the record that "the only way to 
bring sanity and consistency to contractual relations" is to 
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apply the principle that a prior breach of a mutually dependent 
contract obligation excuses performance of the reciprocal obliga-
tion. .Id. at 66. 
In making this argument, however, the Franchisee 
ignores a crucial fact: he adduced no evidence and otherwise 
failed to demonstrate that his obligation to honor the confiden-
tiality provisions of the Franchise Agreements was dependent or 
conditional upon the Franchisor's obligation to pay the full 
amount of earned sales commissions. Indeed, the Franchise Agree-
ments belie the possibility of a finding that these obligations 
are dependent or conditional on each other. Paragraph 
14(a)(iv)(d) of the Franchise Agreements provide in unmistakable 
terms that the Franchisee's obligation to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the Franchisor's customer information survives even 
the termination of the balance of the Agreement. Moreover, para-
graph 8 of the Agreements—entitled "Obligations of Franchisee"— 
nowhere states that the Franchisor's performance of its obliga-
tions is a condition to its right to enforce the Franchisee's 
obligations, generally, or the Franchisee's confidentiality obli-
gations, specifically. Under the Agreements, therefore, the par-
ties' respective obligations are independent, divisible cove-
nants, not mutually dependent or conditional covenants. As such, 
the Franchisor's failure to pay all earned sales commissions does 
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not excuse the Franchisee's obligation to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the Franchisor's customer information. 
This is consistent with Utah law: "A simple statement 
or stipulation in a contract is not necessarily a condition to a 
party's duty of performance. The intent to create a condition in 
a contract must appear expressly or by clear implication." 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1978). Indeed, the 
law is settled that language of a contract will be construed 
wherever possible cis a covenant and not as a condition. Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, § 227(1) (1981). 
Because there is no evidence that the Franchisor's gen-
eral contractual obligations were anything other than independent 
of, and divisible from, the Franchisee's obligation to maintain 
the confidentiality of the Franchisor's customer information, 
there is no legal basis for the Franchisee's clciim that the Court 
should simply strike the damages award on the Franchisor's coun-
terclaim. The Court should either affirm the trial court's 
treatment of this issue or remand for a new tricil of all issues. 
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7. The Trial Court Properly Determined that the Fran-
chisee was not the Prevailing Party for Purposes 
of Recovering Attorneys7 Fees.14 
The Franchisee's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
as a basis for an award of attorneys7 fees in this case is mis-
placed. That section provides that the Court shall award attor-
neys7 fees to a prevailing party 7/. . . if the Court determines 
that the . . . defense to the action was without merit and not 
. . . asserted in good faith. . . .77 Straining to meet those 
criteria, the Franchisee then hypothesizes that: 
If a Plaintiff can convince a jury of all of 
the relief awarded to [the Franchisee] in 
this action for [the Franchisor7s] tortious 
and bad faith conduct, including an award of 
punitive damages, he clearly [is entitled to 
attorneys7 fees under Section 78-27-56]. 
The Franchisee7s argument turns the statute on its 
head. Under the Franchisee7s interpretation, any time a plain-
tiff prevails on a contested claim, he is automatically entitled 
to an award of attorneys7 fees. That interpretation is belied 
not only by the clear terms of the statute, but by Utah case law. 
In Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the term 77without merit77 was synonymous 
with 77frivolous." The Court also held in Cady that to establish 
1 4
 To support this argument, the Franchisor incorporates by 
reference all of the points and authorities set forth in Appel-
lants Brief at 38-39 and Appellant7s Reply Brief supra at 13-16. 
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lack of "good faith," the prevailing party must establish either 
(i) the absence of an honest belief in the propriety of the 
defense, (ii) an intent to take unconcsionable advantage, or 
(iii) an intent to hinder, delay or defraud another. Ld. if the 
evidence fails to ". . . affirmatively establish a lack of at 
least one of the three elements of good faith," id. at 152, there 
is no basis for the imposition of attorneys' fees under the stat-
ute. 
The Franchisee's contention that the Franchisor's 
defense was "without merit" and was "asserted in bad faith" com-
pletely ignores a number of vitally important, undisputed facts: 
(1) The Franchisee's Second Amended Complaint sought 
compensatory and punitive damages of more than $2 5 million. The 
jury awarded only $85,000—an infinitesimal percentage of the 
amount requested. 
(2) Of the 18 claims for relief asserted in the Second 
Amended Complaint, two were dismissed before trial, nine were 
rejected by the jury, and only seven were validated by the jury. 
The Franchisor, therefore, prevailed on eleven of the original 18 
claims. 
(3) The jury awarded the Franchisor over $15,000 of 
damages on its counterclaim—a counterclaim that arose out of the 
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same transactions and occurrences alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint. 
(4) The trial court awarded the Franchisor an addi-
tional "equitable" amount of $11,014. 
(5) The trial court awarded the Franchisor attorneys' 
fees of $7,564.50 on its successful defense of the Racketeering 
Claims. 
(6) Beyond the Racketeering Claims, the trial court 
determined that neither party, under the circumstances of this 
case, could be the "prevailing party" for the purpose of attor-
neys' fees. 
(7) The trial court determined that the Injunction was 
not improperly issued. 
Whatever else may be said about the validity of the 
many claims and defenses, the trial court's final disposition of 
this case was a decidedly mixed bag of partial successes and par-
tial failures for the parties. After they generated thousands of 
pages of pleadings and papers, conducted thirteen months of dis-
covery and suffered through five days of trial and innumerable 
post-verdict hearings, neither party could claim complete suc-
cess. The Franchisee's suggestion that the Franchisor's defense 
was somehow frivolous and asserted in bad faith ignores this 
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reality. There is no basis for awarding attorneys' fees to the 
Franchisee under § 78-27-56 or any other statute or contract. 
8. The Trial Court's Award of an Equitable Payment of 
$11,014 is not Assailable on the Basis That the 
Franchisee "Fully Performed his Obligations Under 
the Contracts."115 
In an effort to eliminate the "equitable" payment of 
$11,014, the Franchisee argues that because he supposedly "fully 
performed his obligations under the contracts," the Franchisor is 
not entitled to the payment. (Appellee's Brief at 69.) That 
argument, however, misrepresents the record. The jury did not 
determine that the Franchisee fully performed his obligations 
under the parties' contracts. Indeed, the jury determined that 
the Franchisee breached his contractual obligations to maintain 
the confidentiality of the Franchisor's customer information for 
which damages of $10,000 were awarded and willfully converted the 
Franchisor's property for which damages of over $5,000 were 
awarded. The equitable payment, therefore, cannot be vacated on 
the basis that the Franchisee suggests. 
1 5
 As demonstrated in Appellant's Brief at 46-48 and Appel-
lant's Reply Brief at 20-22, supra, the trial court's award of an 
equitable payment of $11,014 as a substitute for making final the 
Preliminary Injunction is not sustainable on appeal. However, if 
this Court concludes that the equitable payment is a valid sub-
stitute for the entry of a permanent injunction, the payment 
should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the 
Franchisee's Judgment and remand this case for a new trial of all 
issues identified by the Franchisor. 
DATED this '4 day of December, 1992. 
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